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The English Approach to
Compétence-Compétence
Ozlem Susler*
I.

INTRODUCTION

This article examines the United Kingdom legislation, case law, and
practice in compétence-compétence. It provides an overview of arbitral
jurisdiction and proceeds to review the English approach to arbitral
jurisdiction. The extent and the stage at which court intervention occurs in
this jurisdiction is examined by focusing on the strengths and weaknesses of
the United Kingdom approach. The article begins with an analysis of the
positive and negative effect of compétence-compétence. This is followed by
a historical perspective, which considers the subtleties of compétencecompétence in the English context. Key features of the Arbitration Act (the
Act) are discussed.1 Recent case law is highlighted to draw attention to
some new developments. The focus of the discussion is on the degree of
judicial intervention in arbitral proceedings. It is argued that the practice
adopted by the United Kingdom leaves the door slightly open for parties to
challenge jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals.
1.1. The Dual Effect of Compétence-Compétence
There are two effects of the principle of compétence-compétence,
positive and negative. The positive effect is to permit arbitral tribunals to
make a ruling on their own jurisdiction to hear the dispute. By emphasising
the jurisdiction of the tribunal, the positive effect sets out a framework of
concurrent jurisdiction between courts and arbitral tribunals.2 The negative
effect on the other hand is more controversial and rests on the notion that the
arbitral tribunal should have a chronological priority to rule on its
jurisdiction before the courts.3 The negative effect thereby restricts the
function of the court to provide the tribunal with the first opportunity to
1. Arbitration Act, 1996, (U.K.) [hereinafter The Act].
2. (‘Positive Effect’).
3. Amokura Kawharu, Arbitral Jurisdiction, 23 NEW ZEALAND UNIV. L. REV. 238, 243
(2008) [hereinafter Negative Effect].
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determine its own jurisdiction and the validity of the arbitration agreement.
In this manner, the negative effect bars a court from reviewing the merits of
the dispute when deciding on the existence or validity of the arbitration
agreement prior to the arbitral tribunal.4
According to the negative effect, a national court may review the
jurisdiction of a tribunal at the enforcement stage. Such prioritisation of
tribunals over national courts concerning the review of validity is an
essential feature of the negative effect. Although both the New York
Convention and the Model Law provide for courts to conduct a complete
review prior to the award being issued, the negative effect is receiving
gradual recognition in many countries.5
The basis for compétence-compétence is the intention of the parties to
grant the arbitrators authority to determine every issue related to their
dispute, including questions of jurisdiction. Such authority usually appears
in the language of the arbitration agreement. Meanwhile, the courts still
possess the authority to supervise the ruling of the tribunal but not to be a
substitute. The empowerment of the tribunal to determine its own
jurisdiction in the first instance is tempered by granting the tribunal’s ruling
a provisional status, which is reviewable by the court.6 Courts reserve the
power to conduct a review once an award is issued, to either set the award
aside or enforce it.
In order to give full efficacy to the negative effect, priority must be
given to the arbitral tribunal if the same subject matter is pending a decision
in court. Concomitantly, the court should refrain from intervening until the
tribunal issues a jurisdictional ruling. Further, this must be combined with
the barring of judicial proceedings to determine the validity of a tribunal’s
jurisdiction as well as any determination on the merits of a dispute. The
negative effect does not provide an absolute priority, only a priority for the
tribunal to rule on jurisdiction prior to the court.7 The majority of
jurisdictions do not provide for express recognition of the negative effect in

4. JEAN-FRANCOIS POUDRET & SEBASTIEN BESSON, COMPARATIVE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION 488 (2d ed. 2007). Most national arbitration laws prevent courts from reviewing the
merits of arbitral awards. See New Decree, art 1493.
5. Stavros Brekoulakis, The Negative Effect of Compétence-Compétence: The Verdict has to
be Negative, Queen Mary School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 22/2009. See New York
Convention, Convention on the Recognition And Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, art. II
(3); Model Law, art. 8. Although some contend that the Model Law art 8 permits national courts to
perform a prima facie review of an arbitration agreement: see Rio Algom Ltd. v. Sammi Steel Co
Ltd., [1991] 47 CPC (2d) 251 (Ontario Court of Justice). See also Pacific International Lines Ltd. v.
Tsinlien Metals and Minerals Co. Ltd., 2 HKLR 249 (1993).
6. Doug Jones, Kompetenz-Kompetenz, 75(1) ARBITRATION: THE JOURNAL BY THE
CHARTERED INSTITUTE OF ARBITRATORS 56, 57 (2009).
7. POUDRET & BESSON, supra note 5, at 458.
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their laws. The European Convention on International Commercial
Arbitration appears to recognise the negative effect in Article VI (3):
Where either party to an arbitration agreement has initiated arbitration proceedings before
any resort is had to a court, courts of Contracting States subsequently asked to deal with
the same subject-matter between the same parties or with the question whether the
arbitration agreement was non-existent or null and void or had lapsed, shall stay their
ruling on the arbitrator’s jurisdiction until the arbitral award is made, unless they have
8
good and substantial reasons to the contrary.

The expression in the above provision “unless they have good and
substantial reasons to the contrary” where arbitration proceedings already
have been commenced, suggests that the prima facie method of judicial
review is enshrined here.9 By contrast, the New York Convention does not
make any express provision for the negative or positive effect of
compétence-compétence. The question of jurisdiction is typically a
preliminary matter for the arbitral tribunal.10 Whether a dispute ought to be
determined by a tribunal rather than a court is subject to questions such as
whether an arbitration agreement exists, whether it is valid, and whether the
dispute lies within the scope of the arbitration agreement. These questions
are addressed below, however, this analysis would be incomplete without a
historical context of the law on arbitral jurisdiction in the United Kingdom.11
II. A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE LAW IN THE UNITED KINGDOM ON
COMPÉTENCE-COMPÉTENCE
Customarily, the English common law tradition was premised on case
law and the doctrine of precedent; in recent history, however, courts in the
United Kingdom have increasingly relied on legislation when resolving
arbitration disputes. The Arbitration Act is the cornerstone of the English
approach.12 The Act came into effect on January 31, 1997. One of its
8. European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, opened for signature April
21, 1961, 484 U.N.T.S. 349, art. VI(3) (entered into force Jan. 7, 1964), http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/
europe.international.commercial.arbitration.convention.geneva.1961/_6.html [hereinafter European
Convention].
9. See infra Part 3 (the prima facie method of review is examined in “Methods of Judicial
Review by Courts”).
10. Christopher Brown Ltd. v. Genossenschaft Oesterreichischer Waldbesitzer
Holzwirtschaftsbetriebe Registrierte GmbH, 1 QB 12, 13 (1954) (Devlin J.).
11. TIBOR VARADY, JOHN J BARCELO & ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN, INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION- A TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 87 (3d ed., 2006).
12. The Act, supra note 2.
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principal aims was to consolidate English law into one statute and create a
coherent legal framework.13 The primary purpose of the Act, as recited in its
preamble, was to restate and improve arbitration law.14 While the United
Kingdom’s jurisdiction is not unfavourable to upholding arbitration
agreements, the legal framework allows greater scope for judicial
intervention. Compétence-compétence does not have the same force in the
United Kingdom as it does in other countries, such as France.15 This carries
a number of important implications, which are explored further in this
article.
Historically, courts of the United Kingdom sought to apply their own
domestic practices and establish a regime of arbitration that would protect
both traditional presumptions, and procedural and substantive rules.16 The
courts did not consider foreign judicial decisions and general rules of
international arbitration important. Generally, English arbitrators deemed
principles of international arbitration law as too academic, too theoretical, or
too abstract.17 The view was that by agreeing to arbitrate in the United
Kingdom, foreign parties had consented to the application of local rules and
customs. As far as the enforcement of arbitration agreements was
concerned, United Kingdom courts only provided half-hearted support for
the principle of separability and retained firm constraints on compétencecompétence. Until 1996, control regarding the jurisdiction of the arbitral
tribunal was almost exclusively in the hands of the courts. The approach
that dominated until that time was that courts possessed the authority to
determine if a valid arbitration agreement existed and they could intervene
before or after the award was made.18 As noted in the Departmental
Advisory Committee Report, it was “generally thought that arbitrators had
no power to do more than express a view as to whether they had jurisdiction
or not.”19
Moreover, case law from English courts indicates that any questions
regarding the validity, scope, or existence of an arbitration agreement

13. Id. Its predecessor, the Arbitration Act 1979 (U.K.) came under increasing criticism for
having been rushed through under pressure from the international community.
14. Inco Europe Ltd. v. First Choice Distribution, 1 WLR 586 (2001) (Lord Nicholls).
15. To obtain an analysis of the French jurisdiction contact the author for her article pending
publication.
16. Willliam W Park, Judicial Supervision of Transnational Commercial Arbitration: The
English Arbitration Act of 1979, 21 HARV. INT’L L.J. 87, 88 (1980).
17. Stewart R. Shackleton, English Arbitration and International Practice, 5(2) INT’L
ARBITRATION L. REV. 67 (2002).
18. Id.
19. DEPARTMENTAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE, PARLIAMENT OF UNITED KINGDOM, REPORT ON
THE ARBITRATION ACT 1996 9 (2006) [hereinafter DAC REPORT].
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remained for the courts to address, rather than the arbitral tribunal.20 An
example of the interventionist approach is S.A. Coppee Lavalin v. Ken Ren
Fertilisers.21 The House of Lords held that an English court had jurisdiction
to order security for costs notwithstanding the lack of connection the parties
had with England.22 With respect to Lavalin, Lord Saville stated that it was
perceived as “confirming the widely held suspicion that the English courts
were only too ready to interfere in the arbitral process and to impose their
own dicta on the parties, notwithstanding the agreement of the parties to
arbitrate rather than litigate.”23
III. THE APPROACH OF THE UNITED KINGDOM TO ARBITRAL JURISDICTION
The general scheme of the Act enshrines the espousal of nonintervention and for matters of substantive jurisdiction to be determined or
ruled upon in the first instance by the tribunal.24 The Act does not provide a
definition of arbitration, although section 1 states “the object of arbitration is
to attain a fair resolution of disputes by an impartial tribunal without
unnecessary delay or expense.”25 Since its enactment, courts have
intervened to a greater extent than originally expected.26 Notwithstanding
the power of the courts, arbitrators have the authority to continue
proceedings and to make an award whilst the jurisdictional challenge is
pending before the court.27 The underlying rationale is to discourage parties
from using court challenges as a delaying tactic and to allow arbitrators

20. Stewart Shackleton, Annual Review of English Judicial Decisions on Arbitration-2002,
6(6) INT’L ARBITRATION L. REV. 220 (2003).
21. S.A. Coppee Lavalin v. Ken Ren Fertilisers, 2 All ER 449 (1994).
22. Id.
23. Lord Mark Saville, The Arbitration Act 1996: What We Have Tried to Accomplish, 13
CONSTRUCTION L.J. 410, 414 (1997).
24. The Act, supra note 2, at §§ 1, 30, 32. Vale do Rio Doce Navegacao SA v. Shanghai Bao
Steel Ocean Shipping 2 LR 1 (2002), where J. Thomas held that “without the permission of the
parties or the tribunal, ordinarily the courts should decline in the first instance to intervene in cases
of dispute as to arbitrator’s substantive jurisdiction is convincing.” See also Arts. 5 and 8.2 of the
Model Law; DAVID JOSEPH, JURISDICTION AND ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND THEIR
ENFORCEMENT 294 (1d. ed., 2005).
25. The Act, supra note 2, at § 1(a).
26. Id. See John Lurie, Court Intervention in Arbitration: Support or Interference, 76(3)
Arbitration 447, 447 (2010).
27. The Act, supra note 2, at § 32(2), (4). See Dalmia Dairy Industries Ltd. v. National Bank
of Pakistan, 2 Lloyd’s Rep 223 (1978) and Harbour Assurance v. Kansa, 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 455 (1993).
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whose jurisdiction is challenged to proceed with the arbitration if the
tribunal believes the challenge is groundless.28
The tendency for unnecessary intervention by the courts has led to
criticism.29 Although the act does not adopt the UNCITRAL Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration, the Act follows it in large part,
notably with respect to the nature of the grounds for challenge.30 The DAC
Report sheds light on the key principles that subsequently emerged in the
Act. The report stated:
The ideal system of arbitration law in the view of the Committee is one which gives the
parties and their arbitrators a legal underpinning for the conduct of disputes which
combines the maximum flexibility and freedom of choice in matters of procedure with a
sufficiently clear and comprehensive set of remedies which will permit the coercive,
supportive and corrective powers of the court to be invoked when, but only when, the
31
purely consensual relationships have broken down.

The current English approach is to confer concurrent power on tribunals
and courts to determine challenges to the arbitration agreements.32 Where a
party to an arbitration has raised a jurisdictional challenge in a national
court, there are two methods of review if the court finds it can review the
jurisdiction: prima facie review or full review. The next section examines
the merits of both methods.
IV. METHODS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW BY COURTS
The method of review may be stipulated by the applicable national
arbitration laws, but it is also subject to how the courts interpret the
legislation and the policies adopted. The prima facie review is, as the term
suggests, a basic review to ensure that an arbitration agreement exists and is
not manifestly void or inapplicable. The term prima facie is defined as “[a]t
first sight, on first appearance but subject to further evidence or
information.”33 Alternatively, it can be defined as an evidentiary standard
that is “[s]ufficient to establish a fact or raise a presumption unless

28. DAC REPORT, supra note 20, at 8.
29. See Anthony Crivellaro, All’s Well that Ends Well: London Remains a Suitable Venue for
International Arbitration - But Only Thanks to the House of Lords, 22(4) INT’L CONSTRUCTION L.
REV. 480 (2005).
30. See The Act, supra note 2, at § 30. See also UNCITRAL Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration, UN Doc A/40/17, art. 16 (11 April 1980).
31. DEPARTMENTAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE, DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY,
REPORT ON THE CURRENT ARBITRATION ACT (1989), at 41. The Committee advised against
adopting the Model Law. Id.
32. See The Act, supra note 2, at § 32(4).
33. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 458 (9th ed. 2009).
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disproved or rebutted.”34 In practice, whether a prima facie arbitration
agreement exists is determined by a more limited inquiry by the courts.
Following such a review, if the court is satisfied that an agreement exists, the
judicial proceedings will be stayed and the matter referred to arbitration.35
Public and private resources will be saved if courts conduct a prima facie
review and only conduct a full review where necessary.
A full review is a more in-depth judicial scrutiny to ascertain the
existence, validity and scope of the arbitration agreement. A full review
may, however, lead to reviewing the award on the merits, which is not
generally within the role of the courts. There may be a saving of public
resources if the courts are not required to conduct a full review. Further, the
parties may also realise a saving in that they do not need to pay for legal
costs associated with a court conducting a full review in addition to the costs
of arbitration. A corollary of full review, therefore, is an increase in costs for
the parties and a delay in time. A court may exercise its discretion to depart
from a prima facie review in particular circumstances where, the question
falls within a complex matrix of facts and a prima facie review is insufficient
to determine the question.
In some cases, a prima facie review may prove insufficient. An
example is provided by a complex multi-party dispute involving nonsignatories to the arbitration agreement who may in fact be bound by it.36
The risk of a full review is that it may usurp the jurisdiction of the arbitral
tribunal from ruling on its own jurisdiction. Unless there are legitimate
reasons to conduct a full review, it is inconsistent with the principle of
compétence-compétence.
The Model Law for guidance as to which method of review to apply is
of little assistance. National courts in Model Law jurisdictions differ as to
whether Art. 8 provides for prima facie or full review.37 There are curial
decisions in some jurisdictions where full reviews have been conducted,
which are at odds with the prima facie method.38 Bachand argues that the
prima facie review is more closely aligned to the legislative history,
34. Id.
35. Michael Pryles, The Kaplan Lecture 2009, 27(2) J. INT’L ARB. 105, 108 (2010).
36. See William W. Park, An Arbitrator’s Dilemma: Consent, Corporate Veil and Nonsignatories, in MULTIPLE PARTY ACTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 5 (Permanent Court of
Arbitration, Oxford University Press 2009).
37. Frederic Bachand, Does Article 8 of the Model Law Call for Prima Facie or Full Review
of the Arbitral Tribunal’s Jurisdiction?, 22(3) ARB. INT’L 463, 463 (2006).
38. See Recyclers of Australia Pty Ltd. v. Hettinga Equip. Inc., 175 ALR 725 (2000). See also
Canada Nat’l Rys. Co. v. Lovat Tunnel Equip. Inc., 174 DLR (4th) 385 (1999).
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framework and underlying objectives of the Model Law. One of the reasons
he cites for this view is that full review typically takes a long time for courts
to determine and this may serve the party who uses it as a tactic to stall or
frustrate the arbitral process.39
Courts should be cautious to avoid an interpretation that undermines
compétence-compétence by conducting a full review unless it is warranted
by the particular circumstances of the case. Moreover, it would be
unreasonable for legislation to be too prescriptive in this regard. There
should be some discretion granted to the judiciary to conduct a full review
where a prima facie review would be detrimental to the parties’ interests.
This raises competing interests at play for the court. The court has a dual
role with respect to arbitration. On one hand, it has the role of assisting the
arbitration procedure, yet it also has the role of controlling it. If the courts
become too controlling—for example undertaking a full review as standard
procedure—this risks undermining the integrity and efficacy of arbitration as
a tool of dispute resolution. It will also result in a waste of public and
private resources. Conversely, if the court becomes reluctant to intervene it
may undermine the effectiveness of both arbitration and the courts.
Because agreements to arbitrate are essentially substantive contracts,
critics question why such agreements should have a lower threshold to prove
consent of the parties. It is argued that the threshold should be no different
to any other contract. Moreover, critics assert that the prima facie review
method, fails to establish validity. The prima facie review is criticised,
therefore, on the grounds that it will find most agreements valid, only ruling
out saliently void agreements. Conferring validity to arbitration agreements
in this way is a mistake.40
Notwithstanding criticism of the prima facie review method, it remains
the best option. There is an efficiency argument in that the resources of
courts should not be wasted conducting a full review as standard procedure.
The most substantial ground for upholding the prima facie review is that
unless otherwise stated by the parties, the parties empower the arbitral
tribunal to rule on all issues relating to their dispute. Although the judicial
system reserves the authority to oversee the arbitral tribunal’s decision (to
set aside or enforce the award), it does not substitute for the arbitral
tribunal.41
In conclusion, the prima facie review is more amenable to maintaining
the integrity and efficiency of arbitration while preventing undue delay and
39. See Bachand, supra note 38, at 464–65.
40. Stavros Brekoulakis, The Negative Effect of Compétence-Compétence: The Verdict has to
be Negative, Queen Mary University of London, School of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper No.
22/2009.
41. See POUDRET & BESSON, supra note 5, at 458.
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expense for the parties. More importantly, the prima facie review is
supportive of the negative effect of compétence-compétence.
V. JURISDICTIONAL OBJECTIONS: POWERS OF TRIBUNALS AND POWERS OF
COURTS
This article distinguishes between two alternative procedures for dealing
with jurisdictional objections. One is to have recourse to courts. As seen in
the following discussion, there are a number of avenues to contest the
jurisdiction of the tribunal. The other alternative is to ask the arbitral
tribunal itself to determine its jurisdiction. When a court orders a matter to
be heard before the court notwithstanding a valid arbitration agreement, it
negates the principle of compétence-compétence as adopted in section 30 of
the Act.42
VI. CHALLENGING JURISDICTION OF ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS VIA COURTS
6.1. Setting the Scene
Although the Act expressly provides for compétence-compétence, it also
provides opportunities for the courts to review the jurisdiction of arbitral
tribunals.43 Thus, jurisdictional challenges may be brought under sections
32, 67, and 72. Section 67 provides that a party to an arbitral proceeding
may apply to the court challenging an award of the arbitral tribunal as to its
substantive jurisdiction. The provision allows a party to seek a court order
declaring an award made by the tribunal to be void, in whole or in part,
because the tribunal lacked substantive jurisdiction.44 The court may set
aside, vary, or confirm the tribunal’s award once an application under
section 67 is made.
Section 67 of the Act is the key provision for challenging an award on
substantive jurisdictional grounds. However, there are strict time limits to
such a challenge. Evidence indicates that parties often accept a fully
reasoned decision of the tribunal on jurisdiction in order to avoid the costs of
42. See infra, Part 8.
43. See The Act, supra note 2. The Act’s applicability is not limited to England. See id. at pt.
1, § 2; POUDRET & BESSON, supra note 5, at 464. Section 1(c) of the Act also confers courts with
residual jurisdiction although it fails to outline how this jurisdiction should be exercised. See JT
Mackley & Co. Ltd. v. Gosport Marina Ltd., EWHC 1315 (2002) (TCC).
44. See The Act, supra note 2, at § 67(2).
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re-litigating the same matter before courts.45 However, an important
distinction is made between jurisdictional objections raised by a nonparticipant, on one hand, and a participant in arbitration, on the other.
Section 72(1) states that a person alleged to be a party but who takes no part
in the proceedings may challenge the substantive jurisdiction of the tribunal
by seeking an injunction or declaration in court. Such a person has the same
right as a party to the arbitral proceeding to challenge an award under
section 67 on the ground of a lack of substantive jurisdiction in relation to
him/her.46
Section 32 must be read in conjunction with sections 67 and 72 of the
Act. Its value lies in avoiding delayed proceedings. Section 32 allows the
court to make a preliminary ruling on the question of substantive
jurisdiction. The provision applies where the jurisdictional dispute has gone
to arbitration, and makes it possible for the arbitrators to consent to refer the
jurisdictional question to the court for a preliminary ruling.47
6.2. The Emerging Jurisprudence on Section 67
A significant body of case law concerning section 67 has developed.
The case law indicates that where required, the courts will undertake a full
rehearing into the matter rather than a mere review of the tribunal’s ruling.
This occurred in Dallah Estate and Tourism Holding Company v. The
Ministry of Religious Affairs, Government of Pakistan.48
6.3. The Dallah Case
The Court of Appeal in Dallah held that an order granting leave to
enforce a French arbitration award was correctly set aside by the High
Court.49 The Court of Appeal found that in accordance with section
103(2)(b) of the Act, the government was not a party to the arbitration

45. The parties cannot apply directly to the courts except for situations described in §§32 and
72. The DAC REPORT art. 138 states that these provisions serve to prevent delaying tactics.
46. See The Act, supra note 2, at § 72(2).
47. See id. at § 32.
48. Dallah Estate and Tourism Holding Company v. The Ministry of Religious Affairs,
Government of Pakistan, EWCA Civ 46 (2010) [hereinafter Dallah]. Pursuant to Article V.1 of the
New York Convention which is given effect by section 103 of the Act, if such a challenge is found to
exist by the court, it may amount to a ground for refusal to enforce the award. See Matthew
Weiniger, Supreme Court rejects Dallah appeal and refuses enforcement of French ICC award,
INTERNATIONAL LAW OFFICE (Nov. 11, 2010), http://www.internationallawoffice.com/newsletters/
detail.aspx?g=92e06a4c-113f-4c98-bf83-046301be4056.
49. Id.
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agreement.50 The High Court and the Court of Appeal agreed that an
application pursuant to section 103(2)(b) required a rehearing of the facts in
dispute.51
In this case, the Government of Pakistan (Government) had established
a pilgrimage trust (Trust) for the purpose of serving its citizens who
performed pilgrimage in Mecca.52 Initially, Dallah executed a Memorandum
of Understanding with the Government for the construction of
accommodation. The Trust formed an agreement with Dallah to build
accommodations near Mecca for Pakistani pilgrims. The agreement
provided for arbitration by the ICC in Paris; however, no choice of law was
specified. Subsequent to the dissolution of the Pakistani Government in
1996, the Trust was also dissolved. Dallah consequently sought arbitration
by the ICC against the Government. Although the Government did not
submit itself to the jurisdiction of the tribunal, the tribunal relying on
competence-compétence, ruled that the Government was a party to the
agreement. Accordingly, the tribunal ruled that it had jurisdiction to
determine the claim.53
The dispute was decided in favour of Dallah. Pakistan resisted
enforcement in the United Kingdom courts on the grounds that the
arbitration agreement was invalid under the laws of France, where the award
was made. The Government argued that it was not a party to the agreement
and, therefore, it was not bound by the arbitration agreement. Given that
there was no express choice of law provided for by the parties in their
agreement, the law of France was applied to the agreement. In particular,

50. Section 103(2)(b) stipulates that:
1.Recognition or enforcement of a New York Convention award shall not be refused
except in the following cases.
2.Recognition or enforcement of the award may be refused in the person against whom it
is invoked proves –
(b) that the arbitration agreement was not valid under the law to which the parties
subjected it or failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country where the
award was made’.
51. Gary Born & Timothy J Lindsay, Who is Most Competent? Some Comments on the
Allocation of Jurisdictional Competence Under the English Arbitration Act 1996, KLUWER
ARBITRATION BLOG, (Apr. 12, 2010), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2010/04/12/who-ismost-competent-some-comments-on-the-allocation-of-jurisdictional-competence-under-the-englisharbitration-act-1996.
52. See Dallah, supra note 49.
53. Stephen Moi & Paul Collier, Case Update: Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding
Company v. The Ministry of Religious Affairs, Government of Pakistan, CLYDE & CO. LLP (Dec. 8,
2010), http://www.clydeco.com/knowledge/articles/case-update.
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the question of whether the Government was a party to the agreement had to
be determined in accordance with French law.
On appeal by Dallah, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom
reopened jurisdictional matters relating to both facts and issues prior to
issuing its judgment. As a result, the Court re-examined the issue of
competing interests between the roles of arbitral tribunals and national
courts in ruling on jurisdiction. In particular, the court considered two key
questions: the effect of the compétence-compétence principle and the
application of arbitration agreements to non-signatories pursuant to French
law. Although Lord Collins of the Supreme Court acknowledged the
worldwide pattern to restrict review of determinations by tribunals and
emphasised the pro-enforcement policy of the New York Convention,
neither of these matters played a central role in this case.54
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal by Dallah. The first reason
was that although the tribunal had jurisdiction, its ruling was subject to
review at the stage of setting aside or enforcement of the award.55 Whether
the award has its seat in England or elsewhere is immaterial for this purpose.
In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court undertook a comparative
analysis of how compétence-compétence is used in different jurisdictions. It
is interesting to note that at paragraph 30 of the judgment, the Court
reaffirmed the award being subject to judicial review and held that “the
tribunal’s own view of its jurisdiction has no legal or evidential value, when
the issue is whether the tribunal has any legitimate authority in relation to
the Government at all.” 56
Secondly, the U.K. Supreme Court accepted the submission made by the
Government pursuant to section 103(2)(b) of the Act. Under this section the
court must decide if the party objecting to the arbitration gave consent to it.
The decision clarified the degree to which a court may utilise the discretion
conferred on it in section 103 to re-examine questions of fact and law in
order to ascertain whether a valid arbitration agreement exists between the
parties.
The court found that there was no common intention between the parties
to bind the Government. The Supreme Court concluded its judgment by
affirming the decisions of the two courts below where the matter had been
heard and no jurisdiction was held to exist by the tribunal. Accordingly, the
54. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, opened for
signature Jun. 10, 1958, 330 UNTS 38 (entered into force Jun. 7, 1959) arts. II(3) and V [hereinafter
New York Convention]. Supreme Court Unanimously Rejects Appeal to Dallah Judgment Refusing
Enforcement of a French ICC Award, Young OGEMID, (Nov. 4, 2010) http://www.transnationaldispute-management.com/young-ogemid/.
55. Moi & Collier, supra note 54.
56. Dallah, supra note 49.
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award was not enforceable.57 The judges in Dallah also reaffirmed there is
no duty for a party to contest or appeal an award in the courts of the seat (in
this case France), prior to challenging enforcement in another jurisdiction. It
appears that the Supreme Court undertook a full review on the question of
jurisdiction.
As seen in Dallah, although the United Kingdom is deemed to be a proarbitration jurisdiction, its law leaves the door slightly more open to judicial
review.58 This has accentuated the tension between the English legal
community’s pro-arbitration attitude and the Act, which may assign
jurisdiction to the English courts rather than international arbitral tribunals.
6.4 Republic of Serbia v Imagesat International and the Significance of the
Azov decision
In Republic of Serbia v. Imagesat International, the English High Court
considered the application of section 67.59 The court heard a challenge to
the substantive jurisdiction of an ICC tribunal.60 The tribunal ruled, inter
alia, that it had jurisdiction to address whether Serbia had conferred on the
ICC tribunal jurisdiction to rule if it was a party to the arbitration
agreement.61
In reaching its decision, the High Court relied on Azov Shipping Co. v.
Baltic Shipping Co.62 Azov is a leading authority on section 67. In the case,
Justice Rix stated that section 67 provided the challenger with a means to
“present his case and challenge the opposing party’s case on the question of
jurisdiction with the full panoply of oral evidence and cross-examination so
that, in effect, the challenge becomes a complete rehearing of all that already
occurred before the arbitrator.”63 Justice Longmore opined that the

57. Moi & Collier, supra note 54.
58. See Midgulf International Ltd. v. Groupe Chimichie Tunisien [2010] EWCA 66 (Civ)
where the Tunisian and English courts adopted different approaches to jurisdiction of the arbitral
tribunal.
59. Republic of Serbia v. Imagesat International NV [2009] EWHC 2853 (Comm).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Azov Shipping Co. v. Baltic Shipping Co. [1999] 1 LR 68. Azov’s decision established
that where the seat of the arbitration is the United Kingdom, the court will examine the issue of
jurisdiction brought under sections 32 or 67 of the Arbitration Act as a full review. Id.
63. Id.
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applicants who had their jurisdictional challenge defeated by the tribunal
were “effectively now having a second bite at the same cherry.”64
In Serbia, the Court found that in hearing a challenge pursuant to section
67, “it is for the court to determine whether the arbitrator had jurisdiction
and whether he was correct in deciding that he did.”65 Following the
approach in Azov, the Court also opined that the decision of the arbitrator
regarding jurisdiction is only provisional.66
The significance of Azov lies in its expression of the English principle
that a jurisdictional challenge will be heard de novo and in full by the courts,
even if, in effect, that decides the case on the merits.67 This is in clear
contrast to approaches adopted by other countries such as France.68 It is in
contradiction with the general principle that a court must not review the
merits of a decision reached by the arbitral tribunal.69
6.5. Habas Sinai v Norscot Rig
Another recent case where section 67 received consideration is the
Habas decision.70 The High Court had no reservations conducting a full
review.71 The English High Court in Norscot Rig Management also allowed
a rehearing of jurisdiction, but the challenge was dismissed.72 This is in
clear conflict with the generally accepted notion that courts should avoid
deciding jurisdictional issues on their merits. Some scholars have asserted
that this emphasises a divergence between the pro-arbitration and proenforcement attitude of the English legal community and the wide discretion

64. Id.
65. Serbia, EWHC (Comm) 2853; The Act, supra note 2, at §§ 32, 67.
66. Id.
67. Id. De novo is a matter heard over again from the beginning.
68. See Code de Procédure Civile [C.P.C.] 1458 (Fr.); see also Loi 2011-48 du 13 Janvier
2011 Portant Réforme de L’arbitrage [Decree No. 2011-48 of 13 January 2011 on the Reform of
Arbitration], Journal Officiel de la Republique Francaise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Jan. 14,
2011 (Fr.) [hereinafter New Decree].
69. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, arts.
II(3), V, June 7, 1959, 330 U.N.T.S. 38. See also Albert Jan van den Berg, The New York
Convention of 1958: An Overview, INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, 1
(Apr. 15, 2009), http://www.arbitration-icca.org/media/0/12125884227980/new_york_convention_
of_1958_overview.pdf.
70. Habas Sinai ve Tibbi Gazlar Isthisal Endustri AS v. Cometal SAL [2010] EWHC (Comm)
29.
71. Id.
72. Norscot Rig Management PVT Ltd. v. Essar Oilfields Servs. Ltd. [2010] EWHC (Comm)
195.
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of the High Court’s jurisdiction to hear challenges under section 67.73 In
such circumstances, due deference is not provided to the arbitral award.74
Although the challenges pursuant to section 67 in the cases of Azov,
Serbia, Habas, and Norscot were not successful, the ability to require, as of
right, a full rehearing tends to negate the foundation of international
commercial arbitration.75 The approach taken by the courts in these cases
appears to be in conflict with the concept of limited judicial review.76 The
cases discussed above illustrate that courts do not consistently provide the
necessary priority to tribunals on the question of their jurisdiction.77
6.6. Section 72 of the Arbitration Act: Jurisdictional Challenges by a NonParticipant to the Arbitral Proceeding:
Section 72 allows a non-participant to a proceeding to contest the
jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal.78 An action under section 72 is not
subject to a preliminary contest before the tribunal and its rationale is to
safeguard people who refute that the tribunal has any authority over them,
thereby avoiding participation in the arbitration.79 In some disputes before
the courts, a prima facie review may be sufficient to ascertain the questions
before the court. Conducting a full review of the arbitration agreement
would amount to a waste of public and private resources for the court. 80
VII. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SECTION 32 OF THE ARBITRATION ACT
A section 32 application is not considered unless:
7.6 it is made with the agreement in writing of all the other parties to the proceedings, or
7.7 it is made with the permission of the tribunal and the court is satisfied—
(i) that the determination of the question is likely to produce substantial savings in
costs,

73. The Act, supra note 2, at § 67.
74. Born & Lindsay, supra note 52.
75. Id. The position regarding costs for unsuccessful challenges of jurisdiction in court is that
the losing party pays costs. Id.
76. Id.
77. See The Act, supra note 2, at §§ 7, 30.
78. The Act, supra note 2, at § 72.
79. POUDRET & BESSON, supra note 5, at 412.
80. See Law Debenture Trust Corp. Pty Ltd. v. Elektrim Finance BV [2005] EWHC (Ch)
1412.
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(ii) that the application was made without delay, and
(iii) that there is good reason why the matter should be decided by the court.

The safeguards found in section 32 are designed to prevent parties from
using this provision to stall the arbitral proceedings.81
7.1. Stay of Proceedings While an Application Under Section 32 is Made
Section 31(5) provides that “[t]he tribunal may in any case, and shall if
the parties so agree, stay proceedings whilst an application is made to the
court under section 32.”82 Given that the party objecting to arbitration
would not be against a stay of the arbitral process in order to have judicial
review of jurisdiction, the party in support of arbitration would effectively
determine whether to request a preliminary ruling from the tribunal
regarding jurisdiction.
There are concomitant risks to proceeding with arbitration in the
presence of a jurisdictional challenge. One risk is that if the pro-arbitration
party loses, it will usually suffer the wasted costs of the tribunal proceeding
in such circumstances. Further, there will be a subsequent duplication of
proceedings in court causing delays and more expense. Section 32 would
offer the benefit of permitting a pro-arbitration party who is concerned about
the risk of wasted costs, to give consent to the party refusing arbitration and
have the matter addressed beforehand by judicial intervention.83
7.2. Critiques of Section 32
Section 32 has been criticised for permitting the tribunal to request that
the court address the question of jurisdiction at the outset of the arbitration,
which has been viewed as inefficient. Instead, it has been recommended that
the tribunal render a preliminary award on jurisdiction and only if required,
refer the matter for judicial review.84 This criticism should be balanced
against its aims to create a high threshold to be satisfied prior to judicial
intervention. In particular, if there is failure to effect mutual agreement
between the disputing parties, the tribunal must have legitimate reservations

81. Arbitration Act § 31(5) is in contrast to the Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration.
82.Arbitration Act § 31(5).
83. John J. Barcelo III, Who Decides the Arbitrators’ Jurisdiction? Separability and
Competence-Competence in Trannational Perspective, 36 VAND. J. OF TRANSNAT’L L. 1115, 1126
(2003).
84. Fouchard Gaillard Goldman On International Commercial Arbitration 682 (Emmanuel
Gaillard & John Savage eds., 1999).
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concerning the validity of the arbitration agreement before referring the
matter to judicial review.85
Section 32(2) stipulates the court must be satisfied that determination of
the question is likely to produce substantial savings in costs and the
application is made without delay. This imposes strict conditions that are
clearly designed to avoid dilatory tactics.86 An additional safeguard is found
in section 32(4), which provides that the tribunal may continue the arbitral
proceedings and issue an award whilst an application to court is pending.87
Thus, arbitrators who are challenged by parties have the discretion to
continue with the arbitral proceedings. This provision ensures that dilatory
tactics employed by a party challenging the validity of the arbitration
agreement fail to stall the arbitral proceedings. Although section 32(4) does
not fully accommodate the negative effect of compétence-compétence, it
nevertheless provides some deference to it by conferring discretion on the
tribunal to initiate or continue with its proceedings.
Further, sections 32(5) and (6) of the Act limit subsequent appeals once
the court has delivered a judgment. This section stipulates that an appeal
from the court’s decision is subject to leave, which is only granted if the case
concerns a question of law of general significance or is deemed as “special
grounds” by the Court of Appeal.88 The court must also have substantial
grounds for intervening in the arbitral process. For example, section 72
permits a person who is a non-participant in an arbitration but who is alleged
to be a party to arbitral proceedings, to challenge the validity or scope of the
arbitration agreement.89 These provisions indicate that although efforts are
made to discourage parties from engaging in dilatory tactics, the door is left
open for parties to challenge the jurisdiction of the tribunal in court and the
negative effect does not receive full deference from the courts or the statute
as it does in France.90

85. Doug Jones, Competence – Competence, 75(1) Arbitration 56, 60 (2009).
86. Catherine Kessedjian, Determination and Application of Relevant National and
International Law and Rules, in PERVASIVE PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 83
(Loukas A. Mistelis & Julian D.M. Lew eds., 2006).
87. POUDRET & BESSON, supra note 5, at 485.
88. Id.
89. The Act, supra note 2, at § 72.
90. See infra note 14.
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VIII.POWER OF THE TRIBUNAL TO RULE ON ITS JURISDICTION
The principle of compétence-compétence is addressed in section 30 of
the Act.91 Subsection 30(1) is one of the most fundamental provisions. It
permits the arbitral tribunal, subject to the parties agreeing otherwise, to rule
on its own substantive jurisdiction in three circumstances:
92

(a) whether there is a valid arbitration agreement,
(b) whether the tribunal is properly constituted, and
(c) what matters have been submitted to arbitration in accordance with the arbitration
93
agreement.

Subsection 30(1) is supplemented by subsection 30(2), which permits
rulings regarding the three circumstances above to be challenged by
processes of appeal within the arbitral rules, as well as by judicial review.94
Article 1448 of the New Decree95 is the French equivalent of section 30 of
the Act.96 The French provision is more succinct and does not set out in
detail the circumstances in which the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal may
be challenged. Compared to Article 1448 section 30 provides more
possibilities for challenge, despite the safeguards in the Act to prevent
dilatory tactics.
Thus, the fact that section 30 is subject to the parties’ agreement stands
in stark contrast to Article 1448 of the New Decree.97 Pursuant to the
French New Decree, compétence-compétence is a mandatory provision.98
The powers of the French arbitral tribunals cannot be excluded by agreement
of the parties.
8.1. Advantages of Allowing the Arbitral Tribunal to Rule on its Jurisdiction
Although not making compétence-compétence a mandatory provision,
the English legislators acknowledged the advantages of the principle. The
benefit of allowing the arbitral tribunal to rule on matters of its own

91. The Act, supra note 2, at § 30(1) commences with “unless otherwise agreed by the
parties.” Therefore, it is not a mandatory provision.
92. See Downing v. Al Tameer Establishment [2002] EWCA 721 where a party denied the
existence of the arbitration agreement and this denial was accepted by the court. The court held that
this would bring the arbitration to an end.
93. The Act, supra note 2, at § 30(1). For matters outside the arbitration agreement see M/S
Alghanim Industries Inc v Skandia International Insurance Corporation [2001] 2 All ER 30.
94. The Act, supra note 2, at § 30(2).
95. New Decree, supra note 69, at art. 1448.
96. The Act, supra note 2, at § 30.
97. New Decree, supra note 69, at art. 1448.
98. Id.
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jurisdiction was highlighted in the DAC Report where it was observed that
the application of compétence-compétence would discourage parties from
delaying “valid arbitration proceedings indefinitely by making spurious
challenges to its jurisdiction.”99
An advantage of permitting the tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction
arises in relation to knowledge of foreign laws. International arbitration
frequently requires the application of a governing law other than English
law. The tribunal is likely to be more familiar with the foreign governing
law than the courts. This is because when appointing arbitrators, knowledge
of the relevant law is usually an important criterion. Finally, if the seat is
abroad but the proceedings are brought in the English courts, the courts have
a greater incentive to stay the litigation. This is primarily because the
arbitrators are better equipped and more qualified to address the application
of foreign laws.100
IX. APPLICATION OF THE NEGATIVE EFFECT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
United Kingdom courts have oscillated in their approach to the negative
effect. Some courts have refuted the negative effect whilst others have
supported it.101 It has been suggested, however, that in difficult cases, the
court is inclined to rule on the issue of jurisdiction, prior to the tribunal.
This may be considered a cautious approach where the dispute is too
complex to ascertain existence or validity by conducting a prima facie
review. The English position sits somewhere in center of the spectrum–with
the French position being the most extreme in its provision of exclusive
jurisdiction to the arbitral tribunal.
In this context, it is useful to highlight the interplay between the
negative effect and section 9 of the Act. Subsection 9(1) of the Act states
that a party to an arbitration agreement against whom legal proceedings are
brought, may apply to the court in which the proceedings have been brought
to stay the judicial proceedings. Section 9(4) further provides that “on an
application under this section the court shall grant a judicial stay unless

99. Id.
100. See Joseph, supra note 25, at 295.
101. The Act, supra note 2. Res Judicata means if a dispute is judged by a court of competent
jurisdiction, the judgment of the court is final and conclusive as to the rights and duties of the parties
involved. Res judicata constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent suit for the same cause of action.
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satisfied that the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative, or
incapable of being performed.”102
Section 9(4) of the Act mirrors the language of Article II (3) of the New
York Convention and to an extent, the language in Article 8(1) of the Model
Law.103 The preferable approach to interpreting the provision was
enunciated by the House of Lords in the pro-arbitration decision of Premium
Nafta Prods. Ltd. v. Fili Shipping Co. Ltd.104 where it was held that:
to determine on the evidence before the court that [an arbitration agreement] does exist in
which case (if the disputes fall within the terms of that agreement) a stay must be granted,
in the light of the mandatory ‘shall’ in section 9(4). It is this mandatory provision which
is the statutory enactment of the relevant article of the New York Convention, to which
105
the United Kingdom is a party.

The judgment placed significance on the responsibilities of the United
Kingdom as a signatory to the New York Convention thereby highlighting
the importance of the United Kingdom as a jurisdiction favourable to
arbitration and giving priority for tribunals to determine their jurisdiction.106
The House of Lords noted:
If in a case where an arbitrator does have jurisdiction to decide a particular dispute, he is
to be restrained from so doing and no stay of court proceedings is to be granted, there is
likely to be a potential breach of the United Kingdom’s international obligations in
relation to commercial arbitrations under the New York Convention.†.†.as enshrined in
107
the 1996 Act.

Moreover, concerning the stay of court proceedings, the House of Lords
in Premium Nafta held that “the Act contemplates that it will, in general, be
right for the arbitrators to be the first tribunal to consider whether they have
jurisdiction to determine the dispute.”108 Most importantly perhaps, the
decision in Premium Nafta asserted the doctrine of separability and the

102. The Act, supra note 2, at § 30 provides the positive effect of competence-competence of the
tribunal. Also § 31(4) allows arbitrators the right to issue a separate decision on jurisdiction or to
decide the question in the award on the merits.
103. The Act, supra note 2, at § 9(4); New York Convention, Model Law. See also Barcelo,
supra note 84, at 1130.
104. Premium Nafta Prods. Ltd. v. Fili Shipping Co. Ltd. [2007] UKHL 40. This case
previously came before the English Commercial Court under the name of Fiona Trust & Holding
Corp. v. Yuri Privalov [2007] EWCA (Civ) 20. It subsequently changed names to Premium Nafta
when it came before the House of Lords.
105. Premium Nafta, [2007] UKHL 40 at 37.
106. The term “United Kingdom” is defined as the “United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland” in the status document for ratification of the New York Convention.
107. Premium Nafta, [2007] UKHL 40 (Hoffman, LJ).
108. Id.
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principle of compétence-compétence.109 A contrary approach, however, was
adopted by the court in the earlier decision of Birse Ltd. v. St David.110
9.1. Birse Ltd. v St. David: Negating the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal
In Birse, the parties were in dispute over an outstanding sum which was
allegedly owed by St David to Birse on a building contract.111 As Birse
sought recovery of the sum in court, St David applied for a stay of court
proceedings pursuant to section 9 of the Act.112 In his decision, Justice
Lloyd commented on the power of the tribunal under section 30 of the Act.
His Honour emphasized that section 30 was not a mandatory provision113
and stated that:
The existence of the power does not mean that a court must always refer a dispute about
whether or not an arbitration agreement exists to the tribunal whose competence to do so
is itself disputed. The Act does not require a party who maintains that there is no
arbitration agreement to have that question decided by an arbitral tribunal. . . . A court
would first have to be satisfied that there is an arbitration agreement before acting under
section 9 (and that a dispute about such a matter falls outside section 9). . . . In other
cases it may be appropriate to leave the matter to be decided by an arbitrator. The latter
course is likely to be adopted only where the court considers that it is virtually certain
that there is an arbitration agreement or if there is only a dispute about the ambit or scope
114
of the arbitration agreement.

The divergence of the courts towards arbitral jurisdiction is highlighted
in the court’s judgment in Ahmad Al Naimi v. Islamic Press Agency where it
held that:
[I]t is not mandatory and the existence of the power does not mean that a court must
always refer a dispute about whether or not an arbitration agreement exists to the tribunal
whose competence to do so is itself disputed. The Act does not require a party who

109. Premium Nafta, [2007] UKHL 40. Similar to the Model Law, sections 30(1) and 30(2) of
the Arbitration Act 1996 (UK) permit the arbitrators to determine questions on jurisdiction either in
a preliminary award or in the final award.
110. Birse Constr. Ltd. v. St David Ltd. [1999] EWHC 253.
111. Id.
112. The Act, supra note 2, at § 9.
113. Section 30 of the Arbitration Act provides that unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the
tribunal may rule on its own substantive jurisdiction including whether there is a valid arbitration
agreement.
114. Birse, [1999] EWHC 253 at [4].
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maintains that there is no arbitration agreement to have that question decided by an
115
arbitral tribunal.

Another case which illustrates undue intervention by English courts in is
FT Mackley & Co. Ltd. v. Gosport Marina.116 The court prevented the
tribunal from ruling on its jurisdiction. In so doing, the court relied on
section 1(c) of the Act. Section 1(c) is the equivalent of Article 5 of the
Model Law. The section provides that “in matters governed by this Part the
court should not intervene except as provided by this Part.”117 The term
“should” was argued to be a weaker limitation on court intervention than the
word “shall” in the Model Law and the court in Mackley was willing to take
a broad approach to its powers of review.118 The reasoning in Birse and
Mackley suggests that an arbitration agreement which is prima facie valid is
insufficient to provide tribunals with exclusive jurisdiction to decide the
validity of an arbitration agreement. According to these decisions, the court
must review arbitration agreements, ascertaining their validity and
applicability. In doing so, the arbitral proceedings are delayed, if not
prevented, which is contrary to compétence-compétence and to the purpose
of the Act.119
In a subsequent case, Law Debenture Trust Corp. Plc v. Elektrim
Finance BV, an application was made to stay the court proceedings and
permit the tribunal to determine the dispute.120 The court refused a stay and
held that “[t]here is no support for any suggestion that the court should
inevitably allow the arbitral tribunal to decide the jurisdiction question and
stay the court proceedings in the meanwhile.”121 By interpreting the
tribunal’s authority to have first priority to rule on jurisdiction as noncompulsory, it may be argued that the United Kingdom courts’ construction
of the negative effect restricts its efficacy.

115. Ahmad Al-Naimi v. Islamic Press Agency [2000] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 522, 525.
116. FT Mackley & Co. Ltd. v. Gosport Marina [2002] BLR 367.
117. The Act, supra note 2, at § 1(c).
118. MODEL LAW.
119. The Act, supra note 2.
120. Law Debenture [2005] EWHC (Ch) 1412. See also Azov, [1999] 1 LR 68 (favouring the
approach that the court should determine matters concerning the existence or the terms of the
arbitration agreement). Otherwise there may be two hearings: one before the tribunal and one before
the court on a challenge.
121. Law Debenture BV, [2005] EWHC (Ch) 1412 at [34].
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9.2. The XL Insurance Case: A Renewed Recognition of the Arbitral
Tribunal
The approach in Birse and Mackley has been displaced in recent times in
favour of an approach that recognises the importance of international
arbitration law and practice. English judges are now willing to recognise
that local rules are not always applicable. “They appear increasingly aware
of their role as transnational decision-makers in arbitrations between
nationals of different states.”122 There is now an attempt to harmonise
English arbitration practice with that of other jurisdictions.
The judiciary’s new inclusive approach to international and comparative
law extends to arbitral awards not traditionally considered to be a source of
law in England. Indeed, citation of arbitral awards was actively opposed.
They were believed to lack authority. Fear was expressed that reliance on
arbitral awards would lead to unfairness and the creation of autonomous
systems of ‘pseudolaw’ through departures from State law.123
Thus, in contrast to Birse, the court in XL Insurance Ltd. v. Owens
Corning124 took a pro-arbitration approach. Unlike Birse and Mackley, the
court took a narrow interpretation of its review powers. The issues for the
court included: (1) whether there was an arbitration agreement in existence
between the parties; (2) which law governed the validity of the alleged
arbitration agreement; (3) which tribunal should decide its validity and (4)
how the court’s discretion ought to be determined.125 XL Insurance
successfully obtained an anti-suit injunction to restrain Owens from
proceeding with litigation and sought to enforce an agreement to arbitrate;
the validity of which was contested by Owens Corning.126 Justice Toulson
found that the agreement to arbitrate was prima facie valid and, thereby,
deferred the final decision regarding the validity of the arbitration agreement
to the tribunal stating that:
[U]nder the arbitration clause and the provisions of the Act, it will be for the arbitral
tribunal to rule on the validity of the arbitration agreement, if Owens Corning challenges
its jurisdiction on that ground, unless the matter is referred to the Court for determination

122. Stewart R Shackleton, English Arbitration and International Practice, 5(2) INT’L ARB. L.
REV. 67, 69 (2002).
123. Id. at 68.
124. XL Insurance Ltd. v. Owens Corning [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 500.
125. Id.
126. Stavros Brekoulakis, Research Paper, The Negative Effect of Compétence-Compétence:
The Verdict has to Be Negative, Austrian Arbitration Yearbook, 2009, at 238-258.
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under § 32. I am satisfied that in the meantime, justice requires that an injunction should
be granted restraining Owens Corning from continuing its litigation against XL in
127
Delaware.

His Honour found that as a matter of substance rather than form, it was
unequivocal that the parties had formed a contract that included an
arbitration agreement with the arbitral seat in London and governed by the
laws of the United Kingdom.128 He opined that:
[A]s a matter of good case management, and in compliance with the overriding objective,
which of course all business in this court is conducted pursuant to, namely that the parties
should save expense and should have the case dealt with in ways that are proportionate
given the amount of money involved, expeditiously and fairly the arbitrator’s decision as
129
to the existence of the contract should come first.

9.3. Fiona Trust: The Return to an Arbitration-Friendly Culture?
The decision in Fiona Trust & Holding Corp. v. Yuri Privalov is a
landmark case.130 The judgment played a crucial role in clarifying the
position of the United Kingdom on enforcement of arbitration agreements
and the doctrine of separability. Until this decision, these notions had
remained nebulous. The dispute arose from a number of charter party
contracts entered into between a Russian group of ship owners and a number
of charter companies. The owners claimed that the charter parties were
executed by way of bribery.131 The owners commenced litigation in the
Commercial Court in London on the grounds of fraud. The contracts
included a key law and litigation clause that permitted the parties to resolve
any dispute arising from the contract by arbitration.
Relying on this clause the charter parties commenced proceedings for
arbitration. In turn, the owners applied to the court pursuant to section 72 to
restrain the arbitration on the grounds that the arbitration clauses including
the charter party contracts had been rescinded for bribery.132 The charterers
responded with a cross application requesting a stay of judicial proceedings
in accordance with section 9 of the Act. At first instance, Justice Morison in
the Commercial Court declined to stay judicial proceedings under section 9
and issued an injunction to restrain the arbitration proceedings pending the

127. XL Insurance, [2000] LR 2 Lloyd’s Rep. at 509.
128. INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: IMPORTANT CONTEMPORARY QUESTIONS
35 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2003).
129. XL Insurance [2000] LR 2 Lloyd’s Rep. at 509.
130. Fiona Trust & Holding Corp. v. Yuri Privalov [2007] EWCA (Civ) 20.
131. Id.
132. The Act, supra note 2, at § 72.
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court trial.133 His Honour stated the arbitrator lacked jurisdiction because
the arbitration clause was not separable from the charter party contracts.134
The charterers successfully appealed the decision of the Commercial
court. The first issue considered by the Court of Appeal was whether the
arbitration clause was sufficiently broad to address claims that bribery had
induced the charter parties. Lord Justice Longmore held in the affirmative
on this question. His Lordship stated that:
If businessmen go to the trouble of agreeing that their disputes be heard by a tribunal of
their choice they do not expect (at any rate when they are making the contract in the first
place) that time and expense will be taken in lengthy argument about whether any
particular cause of action comes within the meaning of the particular phrase that they
have chosen in their arbitration clause. If any business man did want to exclude disputes
about the validity of a contract, it would be comparatively simple to say so. . . It seems to
135
us that any jurisdiction or arbitration clause should be liberally construed.

This decision was hailed as a success for cementing an arbitrationfriendly environment in the United Kingdom and reaffirming the doctrine of
separability. In relation to this doctrine, the court held that:
As we have sought to explain, once the separability of the arbitration agreement is
accepted, there cannot be any question but that there is a valid arbitration agreement. . .
If there is a contest about whether an arbitration agreement had come into existence at all,
the court would have discretion as to whether to determine that issue itself but that will
not be the case where there is an overall contract which is said for some reason to be
invalid e.g. for illegality, misrepresentation or bribery and the arbitration agreement is
136
merely part of that overall contract.

The decision in Fiona has shown that in assessing an application under
section 9, the court may only rule on the question of validity of the
arbitration agreement itself in cases where there is a challenge regarding
whether an arbitration agreement ever existed or any other question of
validity affecting the arbitration agreement is particularly raised.137 The
Court of Appeal in Fiona has therefore provided a narrow interpretation to
sections 9 and 72 of the Act, rendering it a decision supportive of
compétence-compétence.138
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
701.
138.
72.

The Act, supra note 2, at § 9. Fiona Trust, [2006] EWHC 2583 ( Morison, J.).
Id.
Fiona Trust [2007] EWCA (Civ) 20 at [17]–[18] (Longmore, LJ.).
Id. at [38].
See also Harbour Assurance Co. (UK) Ltd. v. Kansa Gen. Int’l Ins. Co. Ltd. [1993] QB
Fiona Trust, [2007] EWCA (Civ) 20 at [38]. See generally The Act, supra note 2, at §§ 9,
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X. SUMMARY
The principle of compétence-compétence has gained more traction in
English courts in the last decade. However, it seems to be a case of “one
step forward, two steps back” at times with divergent decisions taken by the
courts. Although compétence-compétence appears to have become more
established in the English arbitration jurisprudence—with judgments such as
Fiona Trust—there is substantial scope for further entrenchment of this
principle. Unlike in France, the case law in the United Kingdom
demonstrates an oscillation between a narrow and wide interpretation. This
has prevented the development of a unified and consistent body of law.
Moreover, there are numerous opportunities in the Act for a party to raise a
challenge to the jurisdiction of the tribunal such as section 67.
It is accepted that the courts must balance two crucial yet competing
interests: (a) to exercise a supervisory role to ensure that tribunals do not
usurp the rights of the parties and (b) to support the arbitration agreement
and ensure that parties honour their agreement to arbitrate. Parties can
request courts in various circumstances to vary, or set aside, arbitral awards
in whole or in part. The above analysis has drawn attention to the
jurisdictional challenges that can be brought under the Act. Particular
emphasis was placed on the ability of non-participants to challenge the
substantive jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals.
This article has traced the evolution of the English approach. The
Arbitration Act was a watershed. It was intended to bring the laws of
arbitration in the United Kingdom into alignment with other pro-arbitration
jurisdictions. However, as has been shown in this article, the Act was only
partially successful in achieving this objective. As Lord Steyn stated
“arbitrators are entitled, and indeed required, to consider whether they will
assume jurisdiction. But that decision does not alter the legal rights of the
parties and the courts have the last word.”139

139. John Steyn, England’s Response to the UNCITRAL Model Law of Arbitration, 10 ARB.
INT’L. 1 (1994).
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